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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
JOHN F. HAWKINS, 
Plaintif {-Respondent, 
vs. 
HELEN H. ALLEN, 
Defendant-Appellant, 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Case No. 
10265 
John F. Hawkins, the respondent, seeks the affirmance 
of the judgment of the District Court and costs on appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The collision in this case occurred as the Hawkins ve-
hicle, having made a left turn, was coming out of the turn 
and started into an easterly course at the intersection of 
First South and Tremonton Street in Tremonton, Utah (Tr. 
2). Prior to making the turn, Hawkins (hereinafter called 
plaintiff) placed on his left turn signal for a distance of 
approximately 100 feet, approached the intersection from 
the inside lane of traffic, and turned into the lane of traffic 
next to the center line proceeding east (Tr. 3, 4). Before 
entering the intersection, plaintiff noted the vehicle driven 
by Mrs. Allen, (hereinafter called defendant) an 86 year 
old woman, parked by a mail drop directly parallel to the 
curb and facing North. As the plaintiff's vehicle entered 
the intersection plaintiff and an occupant in plaintiff's ve-
hicle, one Miss Gent, became aware of the car driven by 
Mrs. Allen which at that time, having proceeded directly 
parallel to the curb at a distance of no more than 2 feet, 
(Tr. 5, 6) pulled into the intersection from an untraveled 
portion of the roadway giving no indication of an intent to 
turn (Tr. 6). In order to avoid the collision Mr. Hawkins 
accelerated but his automobile was nonetheless struck in 
the right rear and damaged in the amount of $181.93. The 
damages were stipulated at trial. Hawkins speculated that 
his speed at the time of collision was, " ... about 12 miles 
an hour" (Tr. 4). Further, under cross examination, Mr. 
Hawkins conjectured that defendant's speed was approxi-
mately the same (Tr. 9). 
After the collision occurred, Mrs. Allen crossed the 
center line of the roadway, continued in motion down the 
wrong side of the road and did not stop until such time as 
Mr. Hawkins indicated that it was improper to leave the 
scene of an accident (Tr. 7). The testimony of Miss Gent 
indicated clearly that Mrs. Allen was never aware of ilhe 
presence of the car driven by Hawkins (Tr. 8). Counsel 
for Mrs. Allen conceded the negligence of his client at the 
hearing on the motion for a new trial. The testimony 
of Miss Gent and Mrs. Allen has not been designated as a 
part of the record on this appeal. 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL JUDGE DID NOT ABUSE HIS 
DISCRETION. 
Defendant relies for his contention that plaintiff was 
contributorily negligent as a matter of law in not yielding 
the right of way to the defendant upon Sec. 41-6-73 U. C. 
A. 1953 (as amended). The statute provides as follows: 
Vehicle turning left at intersection-the driver 
of a vehicle within an intersection intending to turn 
to the left shall yield the right of way to any ve-
hicle approaching from the opposite direction which 
is within the intersection or so close thereto as to 
constitute an immediate hazard, during the time 
when such driver is moving within the intersection. 
In determining whether or not plaintiff was at fault 
under the statute, or in determining if the statute itself 
were applicable, the trial judge was, because sitting with-
out a jury, empowered to decide several issues of fact. The 
trial judge needed to decide whether the Allen vehicle 
which was proceeding in the opposite direction from Mr. 
Hawkins, who was then turning left, was in the intersec-
tion or so close thereto as to constitute an immediate haz-
ard. 
Mr. Hawkins' testimony to the effect that he was first 
into the intersection was uncontested at the trial (Tr. 17-
18). Being the only evidence before the court on that ques-
tion, it would appear that there was clearly substantial 
evidence to justify the factual determination of the trial 
judge in favor of the plaintiff, Hawkins. 
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The testimony of Mr. Hawkins that Mrs. Allen was 
parked parallel to the mailbox on an untraveled portion of 
the roadway at the time Hawkins entered the intersection 
was sufficient basis upon which the judge could make a 
finding as to a matter peculiarly within his judicial discre-
tion. That the judge did so decide is indicated by his state-
ment, 
"However, there is nothing shown by the de-
fendant in this case that, at the time the plaintiff 
commenced the left turn, the defendant's car was 
approaching the intersection. In fact the evidence 
indicates the car was parked at the curb. Also, the 
evidence shows that the defendant's car never did 
enter the intersection from the traveled portion of 
the roadway, but pulled into the intersection di-
rectly from the parking area at the curb, traveling 
a distance of some 15 to 18 feet before striking the 
rear of plaintiff's car, after the plaintiff had com-
pleted the left turn and was proceeding in an east-
erly direction from the intersection." (Emphasis 
added.) 
(Trial Judge's Decision on Motion for New Trial, 
R. 26.) 
A presumption arises upon appeal that the court's de-
cision on a discretionary matter has been made in proper 
exercise of such discretion when the contrary does not ap-
pear from the record. Hanberry v. Fitzgerald, 72 N. M. 
383, 384 P. 2d 256, Anderson v. Johnson, 1 Ut. 2d 400, 268 
P. 2d 427, Book v. Book, 99 Wyo. 433, 141 P. 2d 546. An 
appellant claiming abuse of discretion has the burden of 
proving that contention. Knapp v. Life Insurance Cor-
poration of America, 8 Ut. 2d 220, 332 P. 2d 662. Matters 
b 
falling with the area of judicial discretion will not be lightly 
upset and discretionary determinations are better consid-
ered as reviewable only in case of "gross", "clear'', "plain", 
"palpable", or "manifest" abuses of discretion. Redwine v. 
Fitzhugh, 78 Wyo. 407, 329 P. 2d 257, 72 A. L. R. 2d 644. 
See also; 5 Am. Jur. 2d "Appeal and Error" Section 744, 
page 217. 
The effect of the ruling of the trial court was to ack-
nowledge the defendant's failure to meet her burden of 
proof on the issue of contributory negligence. As to the 
mental processes of the judge on this point there can be 
little question in light of the following: 
"There is no evidence shown by the defendant 
as to the width of the street, or the distance the 
plaintiff must have traveled in order to get through 
the intersection. Since the defendant must affirma-
tively show this by competent evidence, and it has 
not been so shown, the motion is denied." 
(Judge's Decision on Motion for New Trial, R. 27.) 
Appellant has attempted to establish at trial, upon mo-
tion for new trial, and now upon appeal, a mathematical 
basis for the contention that the plaintiff, Hawkins, was 
negligent as a matter of law. The computations begin upon 
the faulty premise that a given speed said to be from 10 
to 12 miles per hour was established at trial for both ve-
hicles. Mr. Hawkins, in fact, "imagined" (Tr. 12) the 
speed of his own vehicle and was, of course, only able to 
conjecture as to the speed of Mrs. Allen's. The Trial Judge, 
however, leaves little doubt as to his thinking on the mat-
ter and reasoned as follows : 
"The defendant further urges that because the 
plaintiff traveled twice as far as the defendant in 
the same length of time, the plaintiff must have 
known, or should reasonably have known, the de-
fendant was approaching the intersection before the 
plaintiff commenced making his left turn. This is 
not so, since the distance traveled by the defendant 
was very short. Even counting the distance trav-
eled in the parking area, the total distance the de-
fendant traveled would be from 60 to 75 feet ... 
Thus the plaintiff could very well have commenced 
his left turn 120 to 150 feet before impact." 
Plaintiff has no argument with the authorities cited 
by the defendant or with the principles of law governing 
left turns therein enunciated. It should be noted, however, 
that in both Cederlof f v. Whited, 110 Utah 45, 169 P. 2d 
777 and French v. Utah Oil Company, 117 Utah 406, 260 
P. 2d 1002, the party turning left turned in the face of an 
oncoming vehicle. Such precedents are scarcely appropri-
ate where, as here, the evidence preponderates against the 
notion that when sighted by Hawkins the Allen vehicle was 
moving. The judge's conclusion that, " ... the evidence 
indicates the car was parked at the curb," clearly estab-
lishes that this matter presents a different factual situa-
tion than the cases cited in defendant's brief. 
Defendant contends that the lower court's findings of 
fact erroneously assumed that the collision did not occur 
within the intersection because the judge is supposed to 
have felt that the intersection was bounded by the edge 
of the roadway and not by the curb line. It is suggested 
that this assumption failed to take note of the statutory 
r 
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definition of an intersection. A careful reading of the Trial 
Judge's Decision on the Motion for New Trial (R. 26) 
clearly indicates that no such faulty assumption was made. 
The judge merely points out that, 
". . . the evidence shows that the defendant's 
car never did enter the intersection from the trav-
eled portion of the roadway, but pulled into the in-
tersection directly from the parking area at the 
curb, traveling a distance of some 15 to 18 feet be-
fore striking the rear of plaintiff's car, after the 
plaintiff had completed the left turn and was pro-
ceeding in an easterly direction from the intersec-
tion." 
The trial judge reasoned that a vehicle parked upon an 
untraveled portion of the roadway was not a vehicle "ap-
proaching" from the opposite direction within the purview 
of the statute. 
POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT WAS NOT IN ER-
ROR IN FAILING TO FIND THAT PLAINTIFF 
WAS CONTRIBUTORILY NEGLIGENT AS A 
MATTER OF LAW FOR FAILURE TO KEEP 
A PROPER LOOKOUT. 
Defendant had the burden of proving contributory 
negligence at trial. Plaintiff was required only to do what 
a reasonable and prudent person would have done under 
the circumstances. Berger v. Salt Lake City, 56 Ut. 403, 
191 P. 233. In order for this court to concur with defen-
dant's contention that respondent was contributorily negli-
gent as a matter of law for failure to maintain a proper 
lookout it must be found that as to that point reasonable 
men could not differ on the question of plaintiff's negli-
gence. 
The testimony at trial was to the effect that the plain-
tiff, Hawkins, upon approaching the intersection and upon 
entry into same was aware of only one vehicle in any direc-
tion, that vehicle being the car driven by Mrs. Allen which 
was then parked parallel to a mail drop on an untraveled 
portion of the roadway. Mr. Hawkins further indicated that 
in making the turn his attention was momentarily diverted 
in avoiding certain holes in the roadway (Tr. 4). It is 
clearly arguable that such conduct was under all the 
circumstances that of a reasonable man of ordinary 
prudence. The decision at trial in plaintiff's behalf was 
an indication that the judge below, operating as the de-
cider of fact, chose so to believe. Unless this court can 
say that upon this issue reasonable men could not 
differ, his decision should be affirmed. Findings of the 
trial judge are ordinarily not disturbed on appeal if they 
are supported by the evidence or at least by substantial 
evidence, even though there may also have been other con-
flicting evidence pending against the trial judge's conclu-
sions. 5 Am. Jur. 2d "Appeal and Error" section 839, page 
282. 
POINT III. 
THE FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLU-
SIONS OF LAW OF THE LOWER COURT 
WERE CORRECT AND IN ANY EVENT THE 
FORM OF SUCH FINDINGS DID NOT CON-
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STITUTE PREJUDICIAL ERROR ENTITLING 
DEFENDANT TO THE RELIEF PRAYED 
FOR. 
Defendant contends that the lower court was in error 
in failing to find that plaintiff's negligence proximately 
caused the collision. Counsel for Mrs. Allen conceded at 
the hearing upon the Motion for a New Trial, the negli-
gence of defendant, concluding that the only issue for dis-
cussion at that time concerned the possible contributory 
negligence of Mr. Hawkins. In light of that admission the 
decision on the Motion for a New Trial of the trial judge 
was confined to precisely the issue of plaintiff's possible 
contributory negligence (R. 26). 
It is difficult to understand in what manner defendant 
has been damaged by the Findings below. If, as defendant 
indicates, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law are to 
aid the appellate court, affording it a clear understanding 
as to the basis of the lower court's decision, it becomes ap-
parent that the court can in this instance readily proceed 
with sufficient facts to understand the decision below. 
The Findings explicitly indicate, "That as a result of 
the defendant's negligence, plaintiff's automobile was dam-
aged in the amount of $181.93" (R. 22). The purport of 
the above statement is to indicate that plaintiff's damages 
resulted or were caused by defendant's negligence. The 
better view followed by most courts is that if the judgment 
or decree is not affected at all or is not affected in a way 
which is prejudicial to the party complaining, a defect or 
error in the supporting verdict or findings may be disre-
garded by the- reviewing court. Boeing Airplane Co. v. 
Firemens Fund Indem. Co., 44 Wash. 2d 488, 268 P. 2d 
654, 45 A. L. R. 2d 984. See also: 5 Am. Jur. 2d "Appeal 
and Error", section 819, page 260. Assuming, as the defen-
dant contends, that the finding is inappropriate and the 
trial court is in error, it does not appear that any substan-
tial right of the defendant was prejudicially affected by 
such defect or error entitling defendant to a reversal. This 
court has taken the position that in the case of erroneous 
findings of fact, the appellate court will not reverse the 
judgment if the findings that should have been made will 
support the judgment. Tree v. White, 110 Utah 233, 171 
P. 2d 398. 
The better view is that failure to specifically mention 
proximate cause in the findings of fact is a mere matter 
of form having little if any validity on appeal. Such failure 
provides no insuperable obstacle to this court's ability to 
interpret, understand and comprehend the rationale of the 
decision below. As a general rule no appeal lies upon the 
court's findings of facts. Attorney General v. Pomeroy, 93 
Utah 426, 73 P. 2d 1277, 114 A. L. R. 726. 
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CONCLUSION 
The trial judge's decision should be affirmed and re-
spondent should be awarded costs. 
JOEL M. ALLRED, 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Respondent. 
15 East 4th South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
RAYMOND M. BERRY, 
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant. 
1473 South 11th East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
